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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH
FRANK P. O'DONNELL,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
Case No. 930300-CA

vs.
MARY A. O'DONNELL,
Defendant/Appellee.

JURISDICTION
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 78-2A-3(2)(i) (Supp. 1992).
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

Issue: Whether the trial court erred in considering plaintiffs present wife's

income in determining that no substantial change of circumstances had taken place for
purposes of modification of alimony and child support.
Standard of Review: A trial court's conclusions of law arising from its factual
findings are examined under a correction of error standard, according no particular deference
to the trial court. Cummings v. Cummings, 821 P.2d 472 (Utah App. 1991).
2.

Issue: Whether the trial court erred in applying Rasband v. Rasband. 752

P.2d 1331 (Utah App. 1988) to determine that no substantial change of circumstances had
taken place for purposes of modification of alimony and child support.

Standard of Review: A trial court's conclusions of law arising from its factual
findings are examined under a correction of error standard, according no particular deference
to the trial court. Cummings, 821 P.2d 472.
3.

Issue: Whether the evidence supports the trial court's findings that plaintiffs

income was difficult to establish, and that plaintiff had failed to establish what his income
was.
Standard of Review: A trial court's findings will not be disturbed unless they
are clearly erroneous, that is, against the clear weight of the evidence, or unless the appellate
court reaches a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Dunn v. Dunn,
802 P.2d 1314, 1317 (Utah App. 1990); UTAH R. Civ. P. 52(a) ("Findings of fact . . . shall
not be set aside unless clearly erroneous .. ..")
4.

Issue:

Whether the trial court erred in awarding defendant $4,000 in

attorney's fees when there was no evidence that she had paid or ever would be required to pay
attorney's fees, since she was an employee of her attorney's law firm.
Standard of Review: Whether the trial court abused its discretion. Rasband,
752 P. 2d at 1336.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from the district court's order denying plaintiff/appellant Frank
O'Donnell's (''plaintiff') petition to modify a divorce decree and to reduce alimony and child
support, and from the court's order awarding defendant/appellee

Mary O'Donnell

("defendant'') $4,000 in attorney's fees incurred in defending against the petition.
The decree of divorce was originally entered in this case in August of 1990. The
financial issues were reserved. At the trial on February 28, 1991, the financial issues were
resolved based on proffers, court rulings, and stipulations, and on May 9, 1991, the court
entered a supplemental decree of divorce, awarding defendant alimony of $500 per month,
child support of $500 per month, and ordering plaintiff to pay the parties' child's private
school tuition and registration fees.
2

On October 3, 1991, plaintiff filed a petition to modify the decree of divorce seeking
to terminate his alimony obligation, reduce the child support payments, and eliminate his
obligation to pay private school tuition and related expenses.
Following a trial on the motion on November 30, 1992, the court denied the petition
to modify the divorce decree. On April 1, 1993, the court entered the findings of fact and
conclusions of law. On May 11, 1993, the court made a further minute entry awarding the
defendant $4,000 in attorney's fees, and on June 11, 1993, the court entered an order
regarding attorney's fees.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff and defendant were married on February 15, 1965, in Edinburgh, Scotland.
(Record on Appeal (hereinafter 4*R.") at p. 147). They have two children, Stephen, who was
already 18 years old when the divorce was filed in June 1988, and Amanda, who was 13
years old in 1988. (R. at 2). Amanda turned 18 in 1993 and graduated from high school in
June 1993. (R. at 40).
Plaintiff was employed as a mining engineer during the marriage. In the years 1980
through 1985, his salary ranged from approximately $39,000 to $81,000. (R. at 637). In
1986, he founded his own company, Scotia Systems, Inc. O'Scotia"). He earned only $17,000
the first year, but the following three years the company did very well, and plaintiff earned
$133,000. $115,00, and $161,000, in 1987, 1988, and 1989, respectively. (R. at 637).
Plaintiff filed for divorce in June 1988. (R. at 2). In April 1989, the commissioner
recommended that defendant be awarded temporary custody of Amanda, that plaintiff be
ordered to pay $3,500 a month as temporary alimony and child support, of which $1,144 was
deemed child support. (R. at 53). The court adopted the commissioner's recommendation.
(R. at 59-60).
In late 1989, Scotia experienced a reversal of fortune due to a dispute with another
company which resulted in large losses to Scotia. (Transcript (hereinafter "Tr."') at 34). In
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1990, plaintiff earned only $48,000. (R. at. 352). Plaintiff fell behind in his alimony and
child support payments, and defendant brought a motion for judgment for the amounts owed.
On August 9, 1990, pursuant to the parties' stipulation, the court granted plaintiff a
divorce, but reserved all other issues for trial. (R. at 143, 149-150). On September 12, 1990,
the court entered judgment against plaintiff for unpaid alimony in the amount of $2,460. (R.
at 163). On September 20, 1990, plaintiff filed a motion to reduce temporary alimony and
child support. (R. at 167-172).
On February, 28, 1991, the trial was scheduled on the remaining issues in the divorce.
(R. at 233). The parties made proffers and reached an agreement, which was read into the
record. Id. Based on plaintiffs income of $48,000 in 1990, and his belief, at the time, that he
would continue to receive at least $48,000 a year in income, plaintiff agreed to pay alimony
in the sum of $500 a month and child support for Amanda in the sum of $500 a month. The
findings of fact recited that the awards of alimony were based on plaintiffs income at that
time of $4,000 per month. (Finding of Fact No. 5, R. at 352). Plaintiff also agreed to pay
Amanda's tuition at a private school. Id. The court rendered judgment against plaintiff for
$6,000 for unpaid alimony. (R. at 360).
Scotia continued to suffer severe financial difficulties during 1991 and was unable to
make regular salary payments. (R. at 34, 38). Plaintiff fell further behind in his alimony
payments; in September 1991, defendant obtained another judgment for unpaid alimony and
medical expenses in the amount of $2,003.08. (R. at 318). In October 1991, plaintiff filed a
petition to modify the divorce decree to eliminate his obligation to pay alimony, reduce his
child support obligation, and terminate his obligation to pay private school tuition. (R. at
327).

Plaintiff attached an affidavit from his six co-workers stating that the financial

situation of the company was so bad that they too had foregone paychecks and had had to
take out personal loans to meet their living expenses. (R. at 339-340).
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On November 23, 1991, plaintiff remarried. (Tr. at 58). His present wife, Susan
O'Donneil (formerly Susan Dykstra), is employed by Scotia as a bookkeeper. (Tr. at 107). In
1991, plaintiff earned $23,900 and his wife, Susan, earned $11,850. (Exhibit 2-P).
In February 1992, plaintiff obtained a judgment in the amount of $3,000 for unpaid
alimony and child support. (R. at 433). On June 10, 1992, having obtained new counsel,
plaintiff filed an amended petition to modify. (R. at 533).
During the first three quarters of 1992, plaintiff received $30,000 in gross salary from
Scotia. (Exhibit 1-P).

At the trial, which took place on November 30, 1992, plaintiff

testified that he did not expect to receive any more money from the company during 1992.
(Tr. at 35). Plaintiff testified that he actually received $21,750.38 in 1992, after deductions
for taxes. Medicare, FICA, an employee cafeteria plan, and a retirement plan. (Tr. at 35;
Exhibit 1-P). In addition to the benefits deducted from his paycheck, the company provides
plaintiff with a company car, for both business and personal use, and pays for most expenses
associated with operating the car. Plaintiff also testified that the company reimbursed him
for expenses incurred for travel and entertainment on behalf of the company. (Tr. at 38, 58,
109).
Plaintiffs wife Susan testified that she had received $11,350 from Scotia in 1991, as
reflected in her 1991 tax return, and that she had received $17,700 from Scotia thus far in
1992. (R. at 107). Susan's base salary was $36,000 a year. (R. at 107).
Defendant is employed as a paralegal in the domestic division of the law firm of
Cohne, Rappaport & Segal. (Tr. at 125). Her attorney, David S. Dolowitz, is a member of
the firm. Defendant has not actually paid any attorney's fees to her employer. (Tr. at 123124). The firm does not bill her. (Tr. at 124).
At the conclusion of the trial, the trial court took the case under advisement. (Tr. at
127). On December 4, 1992, the court issued a minute entry denying the petition for
modification. (R. at 589-591). Plaintiff filed an objection to the proposed findings of fact,
conclusions of law, and order on March 29, 1993. (R. at 636-642). On April 1, 1993, the
5

court entered the order, findings of fact, and conclusions of law drafted by defendant's
attorney. On May 11, 1993, the court made a further minute entry awarding defendant
$4,000 in attorney's fees in connection with the petition to modify; the order regarding
attorney's fees was entered on June 11, 1993.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I

The trial court erred in applying Paffel v. Paffel, 732 P.2d 96 (Utah 1986), to

the facts of this case by considering plaintiffs present wife's income for purposes of
determining that no substantial change of circumstances had taken place which would justify
a modification of plaintiffs alimony and child support obligations. First, the Paffel decision
rests on an earlier case, Kiesel v. Kiesel, 619 P.2d 1374 (Utah 1980), which has since been
overturned by the legislature's adoption of a statute prohibiting the trial court from using the
income of the obligor's new spouse in determining an award of child support under the child
support guidelines. Second, Paffel is inapplicable because the facts are different: In Paffel,
the ex-husband tried to offset his income by including his new wife's expenses with his own.
Here, the plaintiff excluded his present spouse's expenses as well as her income from his own
expenses and income.
II.

The trial court erred in applying Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331, to conclude that

travel and entertainment expenses must be considered in determining the plaintiffs income.
In Rasband, the court was merely commenting on the disparity in the incomes of the parties
created by the trial court's meager award of alimony to a wife who had zero income after a
30-year marriage-the court noted that the disparity was augmented by the husband's ability
to expense some personal items through his business. The case was remanded for findings
on the wife's ability to produce sufficient income for herself—the case does not hold that
business travel and entertainment expenses must be considered or even should be considered
in determining the husband's income for purposes of modifying an alimony award.
III.

The trial court's findings that plaintiffs income was difficult to establish and

that plaintiff had failed to establish his income are clearly erroneous. It is not difficult to tell

what plaintiffs income is just because he is employed by a closely held corporation in which
he is also a principal. Plaintiff presented uncontroverted evidence of his salary for the two
years preceding the hearing, which showed that plaintiffs gross salary had decreased by
$1,500 a month since the time the divorce decree was entered, due to a reversal of fortune
suffered by his company. Plaintiff drives a company car and has an expense account he uses
to entertain clients and travel on company business. Although plaintiff did not show the
exact value of these benefits, the evidence was uncontroverted that these benefits were about
the same as they had been when the divorce decree was entered. Therefore, the court's
finding that plaintiff had failed to establish a change in circumstances is clearly against the
weight of the evidence.
IV.

The trial court erred in awarding defendant $4,000 in attorney's fees when the

court failed to make the requisite findings of financial need of the receiving party and ability
of the other party to pay. The trial court merely found that plaintiff earned more money than
defendant. Such a finding is not sufficient to base an award of attorney's fees in a divorce
modification proceeding. Moreover, defendant is employed by her attorney, and there was
no evidence in the record that she had ever paid, or ever would be required to pay, attorney's
fees in this matter. Therefore, defendant did not demonstrate a financial need for attorney's
fees.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONSIDERING PLAINTIFF'S
PRESENT WIFE'S INCOME IN DETERMINING THAT NO
SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES HAD
TAKEN PLACE FOR PURPOSES OF MODIFICATION OF
ALIMONY AND CHILD SUPPORT

In determining that there had been no change in circumstances, justifying a change in
plaintiffs alimony and child support obligations, the trial court considered not only plaintiffs
income, but also the income of plaintiffs present wife, expressly relying on Pqffel, 732 P.2d
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96. (Minute Entry and Conclusions of Law 11 1). The trial court erred in applying Paffel to
this case for two reasons.
First, the Utah Supreme Court based its decision in Paffel on an earlier decision
which has since been overturned by the legislature. In Paffel, the Utah Supreme Court
rejected the appellant's complaint that the trial court had abused its discretion by considering
his present wife's income and separate assets in determining his ability to pay alimony. The
court cited its earlier decision in KieseL 619 P.2d 1374, holding that it was not improper to
consider the income earned by the plaintiffs present wife in determining the ability of the
plaintiff to pay child support. In PaffeU the court reasoned that because the supporting
spouse's ability to pay is a factor in determining both child support and spousal support, the
situations are analogous, and the analysis should be similar. Therefore, the court found that
the principle stated in Kiesel applied in Paffel.
However, in 1989, the Utah legislature expressly eliminated consideration of a new
spouse's income for purposes of calculating each parent's share of the child support award.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-45-7.4 (Supp. 1992) provides: "Only income of the natural or
adoptive parents of the child may be used to determine the award under [the child support]
guidelines/' Since the ability of the supporting spouse to pay child support and his ability to
pay alimony are subject to the same principles, as the Utah Supreme Court announced in
Paffel, the trial court is now precluded from considering the present wife's income for
purposes of determining ability to pay child support and alimony.
Second, the facts of this case distinguish it from Paffel.

In Paffel, the appellant

included the joint expenses of himself and his present wife in his testimony at the trial
concerning his expenses and his ability to pay support. Obviously, it would not have been
fair to let appellant offset his income with his new wife's expenses without also including her
income.

Here, the plaintiff specifically excluded his present wife's expenses from the

evidence he presented at trial. (Exhibit P-3).

Thus, the court erred in applying Paffel to the facts of the present case and in
considering plaintiffs present wife's income in concluding that there was no substantial
change of circumstances.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN APPLYING RASBAND V.
RASBAND TO DETERMINE THAT NO SUBSTANTIAL
CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCES HAD TAKEN PLACE.

Citing Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331, the trial court concluded that in determining the
income of the plaintiff, the court "must consider the value of the perks and expenses that are
paid for him, including travel and entertainment/' (R. at 639,1f 2).
Rasband is wholly inapplicable to the facts of this case. Rasband involved an appeal
from an original decree of divorce, not a modification of the decree based on changed
circumstances. In Rasband, the court awarded the wife automatically decreasing alimony
which ended after five years, and the wife appealed. The trial court had based its award of
decreasing alimony on its finding that the wife was capable of meaningful employment in the
future, even though she had not worked during the course of a thirty year marriage, and had
little education, training, or experience. The Court of Appeals remanded the case to the trial
court for further findings of fact concerning the wife's ability to earn. In dicta, the court
remarked on the striking disparity in the incomes of the parties--the wife had zero income
while the husband earned about $45,000 as an independent insurance agent-obviously, his
standard of living would be much nearer that enjoyed during the marriage than hers.
Rasband. 752 P.2d at 1333. Judge Jackson, writing for a three judge panel, commented,
"[t]his disparity is augmented by his ability to expense some personal items through his
business and by her additional expense in caring for their [disabled] adult daughter."
Rasband. 752 P.2d at 1333.

Later in the opinion, in commenting on the disparity in

discretionary incomes created by the trial court's award. Judge Jackson noted, "[tjhis leaves
him with SI0.000 annual discretionary income, in addition to the advantage he enjoys by
being able to expense some personal living expenses through the business/' Id. at 1335.
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In Rasband, Judge Jackson's remarks about the husband's being able to expense some
personal items through his business were dicta-the court was merely commenting on the
disparity in the parties' income created by the trial court's meager award of alimony. The trial
court's unsupported finding that Mrs. Rasband had the ability to earn sufficient money in the
future was the issue in the case—not the determination of Mr. Rasband's income, and whether
personal expenses paid through a business must be included in determining income.
Thus, the trial court erred in applying Rasband to conclude that travel and
entertainment expenses must be considered in determining the income of plaintiff in this
case.
III.

THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS THAT PLAINTIFF'S
INCOME WAS DIFFICULT TO ESTABLISH AND THAT
PLAINTIFF HAD FAILED TO ESTABLISH HIS INCOME ARE
CLEARLY ERRONEOUS.

A trial court has discretion to modify a divorce decree to reduce or eliminate alimony
if it determines that there has been a substantial change of material circumstances subsequent
to the decree, not contemplated at the time of the decree. Muir v. Muir, 841 P.2d 736 (Utah
App. 1992).
A party seeking modification of a divorce decree has the burden of showing a
substantial change in circumstances. Bridenbaugh v. Bridenbaugh, 786 P.2d 241, 242 (Utah
App. 1990). The purpose of an alimony award is to enable the receiving spouse to maintain,
as nearly as possible, the standard of living enjoyed during the marriage, and to prevent the
receiving spouse from becoming a public charge. Rudman v. Rudman, 812 P.2d 73, 76 (Utah
App. 1991). In determining alimony, a trial court must consider three factors:

(1) the

financial condition and needs of the receiving spouse, (2) the ability of the receiving spouse
to provide sufficient income for him or herself; and (3) the ability of the responding spouse to
provide support. Id.
The trial court concluded that plaintiff had not established what his present income
was, and thus had not established a material change in circumstance requiring modification of
10

the decree of divorce. (R. at 638, Conclusions of Law ^f 4). In reaching the conclusion that
plaintiff had not established what his income was, the court found: "It is difficult from the
records brought into court and the testimony of the Plaintiff and his wife, to determine
precisely what is the Plaintiffs present income." (R. at 638. Findings of Fact f 7).
The court's finding that plaintiffs income is difficult to establish, and its conclusion
that plaintiff failed to clearly establish his income, are clearly erroneous. To demonstrate that
a trial court's finding of fact is clearly erroneous, the appellant must first marshal all the
evidence that supports the finding and then demonstrate that, despite this evidence, the
finding is so lacking in support as to be against the clear weight of the evidence. Crockett v.
Crockett, 836 P.2d 818 (1992).
A.

The Evidence In Support Of The Court's Finding.

At the trial, plaintiff testified that he is employed by Scotia, a company which designs
gold recovery plants. (Tr. at 33). Plaintiff is the vice-president, a director, and shareholder of
Scotia. (Tr. at 33). Plaintiff owns 15% of the stock of Scotia, and he is one of seven
shareholders and five employees. (Tr. at 33, 34). Plaintiffs present wife is also employed by
Scotia as a bookkeeper. (Tr. at 107).
Plaintiff drives a car provided by the company. (Tr. at 39). The company pays for
gas, insurance, and repairs. Id. Plaintiff does not know how much the insurance premiums
are. (Tr. at 71). The company pays plaintiff s medical insurance. (Tr. at 39).
Plaintiff has an expense account which he uses to entertain clients and business
prospects and travel on company business. (Tr. at 39, 58, 109). Sometimes plaintiffs wife
accompanies him at lunches when he entertains clients. (Tr. at 58). Plaintiff does not keep
track of his own meals and those of his wife, separate from those of his clients. (Tr. at 79;
Exhibit 7-D).
B.

The Evidence In Contravention Of The Court's Finding.

The evidence in support of the court's finding is so scanty that the trial court, in effect,
laid down a per se rule that because plaintiff is employed by a closely held corporation in
11

which he is a principal, it is impossible to tell what he actually receives from the company.
However, plaintiffs evidence of his income was uncontroverted and clearly demonstrated a
substantial decrease from his income at the time of the hearing on the supplemental decree of
divorce on February 28, 1991.
Plaintiff presented evidence of his salary for the previous two years at the hearing on
November 30, 1992. Exhibit 1-P is a company ledger sheet which shows plaintiffs earnings
for 1992 through November 23, 1992, and the amounts withheld from each check. Plaintiff
testified that he did not expect to receive any more salary payments for 1992 because there
was no money coming in to the company. (Tr. at 35). According to the exhibit and plaintiffs
testimony, his gross salary was $30,000 for 1992, of which he received $21,750.38 after
deductions for taxes, Medicare, FICA, an employee cafeteria plan, and retirement (ATR
insurance). Exhibit 2-P is a copy of plaintiffs 1991 individual income tax return and W-2
forms, which shows that plaintiffs income was $23,900 in 1991—less than half the $48,000
salary he was supposed to receive in 1991.
The 1992 ledger sheet (Exhibit 1 -P) shows the exact amount of benefits paid by the
company for plaintiff in the form of deductions for a cafeteria plan and for ATR insurance,
which is a voluntary retirement program. (R. at 108).
Nor are the other benefits plaintiff receives from the company-mainly a company car
and some meals-substantially difficult to quantify. Defendant's Exhibit 8-D, which itemizes
plaintiffs business expenses for the last quarter of 1991, shows plaintiff eating lunch with
clients an average of seven times a month—eating lunch once or twice a week at company
expense can hardly be termed a significant benefit or one that is very difficult to evaluate.
Likewise, the use of a company car is not a benefit that is difficult to value, or even relevant
for purposes of determining plaintiffs disposable income, since the expense of owning and
operating his own automobile normally would be included in plaintiffs statement of
expenses. Here, plaintiff included only minimal monthly automobile expenses—$20, which
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he testified he spent for washing and parking the car—attributable to his use of an automobile
in his statement of monthly expenses introduced at the trial. (Exhibit 3-P).
In addition, the fact that plaintiff drives a company car and eats a few meals a week at
company expense is not really relevant to the issue of whether his income has changed, since
these are benefits plaintiff has always enjoyed. (Tr. at 116). Plaintiff testified that the car
was purchased in 1988, when the company was more prosperous, and that the company had
tried to get rid of the car, but its bluebook value was less than the amount owing on it. (Tr. at
105). In plaintiffs financial declaration, filed October 4, 1989, plaintiff did not claim any
auto expense or auto payments as monthly expenses. (R. at 72).
Finally, the court's finding that plaintiff receives a travel and entertainment allowance
from the company is unsupported by any evidence in the record. Plaintiff testified that the
company reimbursed him for his travel and entertainment expenses incurred on behalf of the
company, but that he did not receive any reimbursement for personal travel or entertainment.
(Tr. at 39).
In Muir, 841 P.2d 736, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's order modifying
a divorce decree to reduce the husband's obligation to pay alimony, and remanded the case to
the trial court for more detailed findings concerning the husband's income from his business.
The court rejected as inadequate the trial court's finding that the husband's income had
decreased.
The facts in this case are distinguishable from those in Muir. In Muir, the husband,
who owned 96.61% of the stock and had total discretion over the amount he received as
compensation each year, claimed that even though gross revenues of his business were the
same, expenses had increased, depreciation had decreased, and the business needed capital
reinvestment. Here, plaintiff owns only 15% of the stock in the company, which hardly gives
him total control over the company.

In addition, plaintiff testified that the company's

revenues had decreased drastically, forcing all the employees to take pay cuts. There is no
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evidence here, as there was in Muir, that the company is making a profit or that any amounts
are being reinvested in the company.
Plaintiffs evidence shows exactly what he received from the company during the
relevant time periods. The evidence is undisputed that plaintiff received gross wages of
$23,900 in 1991, and $30,000 in 1992, while his benefits remained about the same. The
parties stipulated that his expenses were about the same. (Tr. at 111). The difference
between plaintiffs 1992 income and the income upon which alimony and child support were
based of $48,000, is $18,000, or $1,500 a month, which represents a substantial and material
change in circumstances.
IV.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING DEFENDANT
S4,000 IN ATTORNEY'S FEES WHEN THERE WAS NO
EVIDENCE THAT SHE HAD PAID OR EVER WOULD BE
REQUIRED TO PAY ATTORNEY'S FEES

A trial court has the discretion to award costs and attorney's fees in divorce and
modification proceedings.

Crockett, 836 P.2d 818.

However, the decision to award

attorney's fees must be based upon the financial need of the receiving spouse, the ability of
the other spouse to pay, and the reasonableness of the fees. Id.
Here, the trial court ordered plaintiff to pay defendant $4,000 for her attorney's fees.
(R. at 697-698). The court found that defendant had incurred attorney's fees of $5,616.75.
The court also found that:
[B]oth Plaintiff and his present wife are employed, and that Plaintiff has actual
earnings and the obligation of support to him owed by his present wife while the
Defendant has lesser earnings and no additional support coming to her, . . . the
Plaintiff has the ability to assist Defendant in payment of her attorney's fees . . . .
R. at 697-698.
Plaintiff appeals from the court's award of attorney's fees to defendant for three
reasons. First, plaintiff objects to the trial court's finding, as reflected in the order drafted by
defendant's attorney, that the attorney's fees were reasonable-such a finding does not reflect
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the court's findings as reflected in its minute entry of May 11, 1993, or in its announcement
in open court during the hearing on the issue of attorney's fees on May 11, 1993. (R. at 674).
Second, a finding that defendant has lesser earnings than plaintiff is not tantamount to
a finding that defendant has a financial need for attorney's fees-the court must find that
defendant is in financial need of having her attorney's fees paid, not merely that plaintiff
makes more money than defendant. Likewise, the fact that plaintiff makes more money than
defendant is not proof that he has the ability to pay the defendant's attorney's fees. Since the
trial court failed to make the requisite findings to support its award of attorney's fees, the trial
court erred, as a matter of law, in ordering plaintiff to pay defendant's attorney's fees.
Third, there is no evidence in the record that defendant has actually paid or will be
required to pay attorney's fees in this matter, as defendant is employed by her attorney.
Defendant testified that she had not paid any attorney's fees in this matter, and that she had
not received any bills for attorney's fees. (Tr. at 123-124). There is simply no evidence in
the record that defendant has a financial need for attorney's fees. Thus, the court erred in
ordering plaintiff to pay defendant's attorneys fees.
CONCLUSION
The trial court concluded that plaintiff failed to establish a substantial change in his
income because plaintiff failed to establish precisely what his and his present wife's income
is.

This conclusion is clearly erroneous; first, it is improper for the court to consider

plaintiffs present wife's income, and second, plaintiff presented wage statements and ledger
sheets showing exactly what he received in wages from the company in 1991 and 1992, and
this evidence was undisputed. It is also undisputed that plaintiff drives a company car and
that he is reimbursed for meals he eats while entertaining clients. The fact that plaintiff did
not show the precise value of these benefits is irrelevant to the question of whether his
income has changed, because these are benefits plaintiff had when the original divorce decree
was entered.
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Plaintiffs evidence that his income had decreased by $1,500 per month is
uncontroverted.

Such a decrease represents a substantial and material change in

circumstances and warrants a modification of the decree of divorce. Plaintiff requests the
Court of Appeals reverse the decision of the trial court denying plaintiffs petition to modify
the decree of divorce.
DATED this 6th day of August, 1993.
Respectfully submitted,
KRUSE, LANDA & MAYCOCK
A Professional Corporation
Eighth Floor, Bank One Tower
50 West Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

By_

dflL

ELLEN MApebCK
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I mailed four true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF
APPELLANT to the following, postage prepaid, this 6th day of August. 1993:
David S. Dolowitz. Esq.
Cohne. Rappaport & Segal
525 East 100 South, Fifth Floor
P.O. Box 11008
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008

ADDENDUM INDEX
1.

Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law per Minute Entry Dated
September 25, 1991, entered October 10, 1991.

2.

Amended Supplemental Decree of Divorce and Judgment per Minute Entry of
September 25, 1991, entered October 10, 1991.

3.

Minute Entry dated December 4. 1991.

4.

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law entered April 1, 1993.

5.

Order entered April 1, 1993.

6.

Minute Entry dated May 11,1993.

7.

Order and Judgment entered June 14, 1993.
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
oooOooo
FRANK P. 0' DONNELL,

AMENDED
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW PER MINUTE
ENTRY DATED SEPTEMBER 25,
1991

Plaintiff,
vs.
MARY A. 0' DONNELL,

)

Civil No. 884902181DA
Judge Richard H. Moffat

Defendant,
oooOooo
The above-entitled matter came before the court for trial, the
Honorable Richard H. Moffat presiding on Thursday, the 28th day of
February,

1991.

The

plaintiff

was

present

in

person

and

represented by counsel, James P. Cowley and Matthew F. McNulty.
Defendant was present in person and represented by counsel David S.
Dolowitz.

The parties entered into discussion with the court, made

proffers of evidence which the parties thereafter were placed under
oath and swore that they were true and correct

and presented

certain issues to the court which were thereafter argued.
court

then

took

certain

questions

under

advisement

and

The
being

advised in the premises, issued its decision in regard to those
issues and determined to accept the stipulations of the parties.
The court entered a subsequent order on June 21, 1991, amending the

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. Based thereon, the court
has determined and hereby makes and enters its:
FINDINGS

1.

OF FACT

A Decree of Divorce has been previously entered in this

matter on the 9th day of August, 1990.
2.

The parties

have had

as issue

of this

marriage

two

children one of whom, Amanda, is a minor who will be sixteen (16)
in February of 1991.
3.

The parties stipulated that care, custody and control of

the Amanda should be awarded to the defendant subject to reasonable
rights of visitation in the plaintiff.
4.

The

plaintiff

agreed

that

he

should

be

required

to

provide such health insurance protection for Amanda as is available
through his employment and each of the parties agree that they
should be required to pay one-half (1/2) of any uninsured medical
or dental expenses incurred on behalf of Amanda.
5.

The plaintiff was employed throughout the marriage and

has had the following history of earnings:
Year

Company

Amount

1980

Kilborn, Ltd.

$ 39,203

1981

Kilborn, Ltd.

$ 43,508

1982

Kilborn, Ltd.

$ 57,800

1983

Kilborn, Ltd.

$ 49,200

1984

Kilborn, Ltd.

$ 57,694

1985

Custom equipment

$ 80,912

1986

Scotia Systems, Inc.

$ 17, 193

2

1987

Scotia Systems, Inc.

$133,391

1988

Scotia, Inc.

$115,653

1989

Scotia, Inc.

$161,000

In 1990, plaintiff had W-2 income of $48,000.00 and presently
has income of $4,000. 00 per month.

The defendant is presently

employed as a legal assistant and earns a gross income of $1,500.00
per month.
6.

The parties agreed that they had earned a higher income

and enjoyed a standard of living more affluent than that which they
presently enjoy, however, there is only enough income to provide
support at a lower level, to wit:

alimony in the sum of $500.00

per month, which alimony would terminate upon the remarriage or
death of the defendant or further order of the court and child
support in the sum of $500.00 per month until Amanda graduates from
high school with her regularly-scheduled graduating class and in
addition

thereto,

the plaintiff

will

pay

monthly

tuition

and

registration fees to Judge Memorial High School until such time as
Amanda shall graduate from that school.

Defendant should provide

books, uniforms and additional school expenses.
7.

Because

historical
marriage,
information

income
the

the present
of

the

parties

regarding

levels

parties

should
their

of

during

each

income

be
on

income
the

course

ordered

April

are below

to

15 of

of

the

their

exchange
each

year

commencing 1991, including the exchange of income tax returns and
six (6) months thereafter, to wit:

October 15, 1991, and every

April and October thereafter, exchange present income earnings
3
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including year to date income payment stubs.
income

exchanged,

they

should

also

provided for their benefit such as

disclose

In considering the
perks, which

are

use of a car, use of a company

credit card, use of an expense account or such other similar items.
8.

The parties agree that the home they acquired on Skyline

Drive, Lot 2 6, Quailbrook Subdivision, and the 1985 Blazer should
be awarded to the defendant and the plaintiff should be ordered to
execute all necessary documents to transmit all right, title and
interest of those properties to the defendant who thereafter should
be required to assume and pay any debts or obligations due and
owing thereon and hold the plaintiff harmless therefrom.
9.
as

Scotia

The parties acquired an interest in a corporation known
Systems,

Engineering.

Inc. ,

and

a

corporation

known

as

Scotia

All of the stock acquired by them in Scotia Systems,

Inc. , 340 shares, and the stock acquired in Scotia Engineering, 150
shares, the parties agreed, should be awarded to the defendant and
the plaintiff should be ordered to sign all necessary documents to
transfer the stock ownership of those securities to the defendant.
In making these transfers, the parties recognize that the plaintiff
is a founder of each of these corporations and has done business
through them along with a third corporation, Scotia, Inc. , which
has been dissolved.

These are the means by which he has carried

out his employment and occupation. He has been the president and
chief executive officer of these corporations.
10.

Each of the parties should be awarded their own personal

property and personal effects presently in their possession.
4

non

11.

The

court,

pursuant

to

the

recommendation

of

the

commissioner in this matter, ordered the plaintiff to pay to the
defendant alimony in the sum of $2,356. 00 per month.
made

those

payments

regularly

until

September

The plaintiff
of

1990.

In

September of 19 90, he petitioned the court to reduce the payment of
$1,000.00 per month and did not make any payments
thereafter.

of

alimony

The defendant has requested the court to reduce the

unpaid alimony to judgment either in the sum of $14, 136.00, the
unpaid original ordered amount for six

(6) months or $6,000.00

granting the reduction requested by the plaintiff.

The plaintiff

has requested that no alimony arrearages be ordered.

The court

determined that the plaintiff is indebted to the defendant for
$6,000.00 unpaid alimony and defendant is entitled to a judgment in
her favor for this sum.
12.
retirement

In

1989, the plaintiff purchased

from

Mass

Mutual

Insurance

an annuity

Company.

for his

The

money

accumulated in that policy has been utilized to try to keep it in
effect and funds are presently due to keep it in full force and
effect. It is in technical default.

The plaintiff is attempting to

maintain that and keep that as an asset.

He should be required to

keep the defendant advised as to his success in reinstating that as
an asset.
13.
year 1989.

The plaintiff filed a separate income tax return for the
He has agreed that he should file a joint tax return

with the defendant for that year.

An amended return should be

prepared and filed, but the plaintiff should not be required to pay
5

any additional tax or penalties due to the Internal Revenue Service
or the State of Utah.
14.

Each of the parties incurred attorney' s fees in the

approximate sum of $10,000.00 which they agreed were reasonable and
necessary since they so closely matched.
DATED this

/V

day of Qj^S^tA^
BY THE COURT:

, 1991.
,

(W

HONORABLE RICfiXRD H. MOFFAT
Third Judici/*/ D i s t r i c t Court

Judge

APPROVED AS REFLECTING
THE AGREEMENT OF THE PARTIES
AND THE RULING OF THE COURT:

MATTHEW F. McNULTY
Attorney for Plaintiff
_____

-

DAVID S.

•'

^ ~ y & ~ ^

DOLOWITZ

A t t o r n e y for Defendant

(cdm\dsd\marysupp.

~*
J

^

fof)
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CERTIFICATE

OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that I am a member of and/or employed with
the law

firm

of

COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL,

P. C. , 525 East

First

South, Suite 500, P.O.Box 11008, Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008,
and that in said capacity, I caused a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law per
Minute

Entry

Dated September 25, 1991, to be mailed to the

person(s) named below:
Frank 0' Donnell
6935 South 825 East
Midvale, Utah 84047
on this

day of October, 1991.

cdm\dsd\o'donnel.cos
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DAVID S. DOLOWITZ (Bar No.
0899)
Attorney
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008
Telephone (801) 532-2666
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
oooOooo
FRANK P. O' DONNELL,

AMENDED
SUPPLEMENTAL DECREE OF DIVORCE
AND JUDGMENT PER MINUTE ENTRY OF
SEPTEMBER 25,
1991

Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No.

MARY A. O' DONNELL,

Judge

Defendant

884902181DA

Richard H. Moffat

£

I6SSD

oooOooo

The above-entitled matter came before the court for trial, the
Honorable Richard H. Moffat presiding on Thursday, the 28th day of
February,

1991.

The

plaintiff

was

present

in

person

and

represented by counsel, James P. Cowley and Matthew F. McNulty.
Defendant was present in person and represented by counsel David S.
Dolowitz. The parties entered into discussion with the court, made
proffers of evidence which the parties thereafter were placed under
oath and swore that they were true and correct and presented
certain issues to the court which were thereafter argued.

The

court then took certain questions under advisement and being
advised in the premises, issued its decision in regard to those
issues and determined to accept the stipulations of the parties.
The court entered a subsequent order on June 21, 1991, amending the

Supplemental Decree of Divorce and Judgments and having entered its
Findings

of Fact

and Conclusions

of Law, now,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that:

1.

This court has jurisdiction over the parties, the subject

matter of this action and the minor child of the parties.
2.

Care, custody and control of Amanda shall be awarded to

the defendant subject to reasonable rights of visitation in the
plaintiff.
3.

Plaintiff shall provide such health insurance protection

for Amanda as is available through his employment and each of the
parties shall pay one-half (1/2) of any uninsured medical or dental
expenses incurred on behalf of Amanda.
4.

The parties enjoyed a standard of living and affluence

higher than that which they presently enjoy.

However, based on

their present income:
a.

The plaintiff shall pay to the defendant alimony in
the sum of $500.00 per month, which shall terminate
upon the remarriage or death of the defendant or
further order of the court;

b.

Plaintiff shall pay to the defendant child support
in the sum
graduates

of $500. 00 per month

from

high school

with

until Amanda
her

regularly

scheduled graduating class and in addition thereto,
the plaintiff shall pay for Amanda7 s tuition and
registration fees to Judge Memorial High School
until such time as Amanda shall graduate from that
2

school.

Defendant shall pay for books, uniforms

and additional school expenses for Amanda.
5.

The parties shall exchange information regarding their

income on April

15 of each year commencing 1991, including the

exchange of income tax returns and six (6) months thereafter, to
wit:

October 15, 1991, and each year thereafter, their present

income earnings including year to date income payment stubs.

In

considering the income exchanged, they shall disclose perks, which
are provided for their benefit such as
company

credit

card,

use of a car, use of a

use of an expense account

or such

other

similar items.
6.

The home acquired by the parties during their marriage on

Skyline Drive, Lot 26, Quailbrook Subdivision, and the 1985 Blazer
are awarded

to the defendant

and the plaintiff

is ordered

to

execute all necessary documents to transmit all right, title and
interest of those properties to the defendant who thereafter shall
assume and pay any debts or obligations due and owing thereon and
hold the plaintiff harmless therefrom.
7.

All of the stock owned by the parties in Scotia Systems,

Inc. , 340 shares and the stock owned by the parties in Scotia
Engineering,

150 shares

and

awarded

to the defendant

and

the

plaintiff is ordered to sign all necessary documents to transfer
the stock ownership of those securities to the defendant.
8.

Each

of

the

parties

is

property and personal effects.
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awarded

their

own

personal

9.

It is entered in favor of the defendant and against the

plaintiff in the sum of $6,000.00 for unpaid alimony previously
awarded to the defendant and not paid by the plaintiff.
10.

In

retirement

1989, the plaintiff purchased

from

Mass

Mutual

Insurance

an annuity

Company.

for his

The

money

accumulated in that policy has been utilized to try to keep it in
effect and funds are presently due to keep it in full force and
effect. It is in technical default.

The plaintiff is attempting to

maintain that and keep that as an asset.

Plaintiff is ordered to

keep the defendant advised as to his success in reinstating that
insurance as an asset.
11.
year

The plaintiff filed a separate income tax return for the

1989.

Plaintiff shall file a joint tax return with the

defendant for that year.

If any additional tax or penalties are

due, either to the Internal Revenue Service or the State of Utah,
the plaintiff should not be required to pay the additional taxes or
penalties.
12.

Each party shall take all actions necessary to implement

and effect this decree of divorce.
13.

Each

of the parties

attorney' s fees.

DATED this

w-

shall

assume

and pay their own

y-

day of /(^^frfj&f^

, 1991.

BY THE COURT:

^Z

HONORABLE RltlHAkO H. MOFFAT
Third J u d i c i a ^ v D i s t r i c t Court Judge

i\r\ncni

APPROVED AS REFLECTING
THE AGREEMENT OF THE
PARTIES AND RULING OF THE
COURT:

MATTHEW F. McNULTY
Attorney for Plaintiff

/cZX-

*

(^^UO-Ces^-C
DAVID S. DOLOWITZ
Attorney for Defendant
(cdm\dsd\marysupp.

dec)

J
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CERTIFICATE

OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that I am a member of and/or employed with
the law

firm of

COHNE,

RAPPAPORT & SEGAL,

P. C. ,

525 East

First

South, Suite 500, P.O.Box 11008, Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008,
and that in said capacity, I caused a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Amended Supplemental Decree of Divorce and Judgment per
Minute Entry of September 25, 1991, to be mailed to the person(s)
named below:
Frank 0' Donnell
6935 South 825 East
Midvale, Utah 84047
on this

;

day of October, 1991.
fi !r
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

Frank P. O'Donnell,
Plaintiff,

:
:
:
:
:

vs.
Mary A. O'Donnell,
Defendant.

MINUTE ENTRY
CASE NO: 884902181 DA
JUDGE RICHARD H. MOFFAT

:

The Court having heard oral argument and taken testimony during the course of hearing
on the plaintiffs Petition to Modify the Divorce Decree to reduce alimony and child support and
now being fully advised in the premises makes this its:
MINUTE ENTRY
The Petition is denied. The Court is of the opinion that the provable facts regarding
current income of the plaintiff are not substantially changed from the basis upon which the
agreement between the parties as to child support and alimony was reached at the time of the
original entry of the Divorce herein. Because the plaintiff is self employed or at least employed
in a company in which he and his wife are major employees, stock holders and record keepers
it is very difficult to establish precisely what each receives from said company. Nevertheless
it is apparent to the Court that if the tests in Paffel and Rasband are applied there has not been
such substantial change of material circumstance as to justify a modification at this time.

O'DONNELL V. O'DONNELL

PAGE 2

MINUTE ENTRY

Counsel for the defendant will prepare an appropriate order.
Dated this _ _ ^ _ d a y of December, 1992.

Richard H.Moffat
District Court Judi

'•fQOUKT

n n r n n

O'DONNELL V. O'DONNELL

PAGE 3

MINUTE ENTRY

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Minute Entry,
postage prepaid, to the following on this

H

day of December, 1992.

Ellen Maycock
KRUSE, LANDA & MAYCOCK
Attorney for Plaintiff
Eighth Floor, Valley tower
50 West Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
David S. Dolowitz
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL
Attorney for Defendant
P. O. Box 11008
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008
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DAVID S. DOLOWITZ (0899)
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL
525 East First South
Fifth Floor
P.O. Box 11008
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008
Telephone (801) 532-2666
Attorney for Defendant

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
oooOOOooo
FRANK P. 0; DONNELL,

Plaintiff,
vs.
MARY A. O' DONNELL,

)
)
)
)

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

)

Civil No. 884902181DA

)

Defendant.

Judge:

Richard H. Moffat

)
oooOOOooo

The above-entitled matter came before the court for trial
on the Plaintiff s Petition to Modify the Divorce Decree and to
Reduce Alimony and Child Support and the Defendant' s Request for
Attorney' s Fees incurred in defending the Plaintiff s Petition.
The Plaintiff was present in person represented by counsel, Ellen
Maycock.

The

Defendant was present in person represented

counsel, David S. Dolowitz.
testimony
introduced
advisement.

of

each

of

by them,
Having

the

by

The court heard and considered the
parties

and

then determined
considered

the

reviewed

the

exhibits

to take the matter under
evidence

presented,

the

arguments of counsel, and the governing law, the court issued its
Minute Entry Ruling on the 4th day of December, 1992.

Being thus

advised

in the premises,

the

court now makes

and

enters

the

following as its,

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

At the time the parties were divorced, the court in

paragraph 5 of its Amended Findings of Fact, and Conclusions of Law
as entered on the 10th day of October, 1991, determined that the
Plaintiff was employed throughout the marriage and has had the
following history of earnings:

In

Xaai:

Company

Amount

1980

Kilborn, Ltd.

$ 39,203

1981

Kilborn, Ltd.

$ 43,508

1982

Kilborn, Ltd.

$ 57,800

1983

Kilborn, Ltd.

$ 49,200

1984

Kilborn, ltd.

$ 57,694

1985

Custom Equipment

$ 80,912

1986

Scotia Systems, Inc.$ 17,193

1987

Scotia Systems, Inc.$133,391

1988

Scotia, Inc.

$115,653

1989

Scotia, Inc.

$161,000

1990, Plaintiff had W-2 income

presently has income of $4,000.00 per month.

of

$48,000.00 and

The Defendant is

presently employed as a legal assistant and earns a gross income of
$1, 500. 00 per month.
2.

The Plaintiff testified that he is supposed to be

paid $4,000.00 per month by his employer Scotia Engineering.

2

3.

The Plaintiff is an officer and director of Scotia

Engineering.

He has remarried during since the entry of the Decree

of Divorce in this marriage.

His present wife keeps the books and

records for Scotia Engineering.
4.

At the time of the entry of the Decree of Divorce in

this matter, the Plaintiff was not being paid $4,000.00 per month,
but believed he would be able to continue to make that kind of
income from Scotia Engineering and in February of 1991 believed
that he could continue to make $4,000.00 per month.
5.

The Plaintiff s present wife, Susan, has a base

salary of $3,000.00 per month from Scotia Engineering.
6.

In addition to the Plaintiff7 s salary, he receives

a car, medical insurance and an entertainment allowance which he
uses for entertaining clients, but which also pays for his travel
and entertainment.
7.

It is difficult from the records brought into court

and the testimony of the Plaintiff and his wife, to determine
precisely what is the Plaintiff s present income.

The alimony and

child support awards that were set on February 28, 1991, were set
by agreement between the parties.

The Plaintiff knowing that

Scotia Engineering was having difficulty paying him,

made the

determination to set child support and alimony at the levels set by
the court.
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the court now makes
and enters the following,

3

noooo

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

In determining if there is a change of circumstances

or determining whether or not the alimony paid by the Plaintiff to
the Defendant should be adjusted, the court considers not only the
income of the Plaintiff, but of his present spouse pursuant to the
decision of the Supreme Court of the State of Utah in Paffel v.
Paffel, 732 P. 2d 96 (Utah, 1986).
2.

In determining the income of the Plaintiff,

the

court considers not only the income which he has paid and for which
he receives a W-2 form, but it also must consider the value of the
perks and expenses that are paid for him, including travel and
entertainment, Rasband v. Rasband, 752 P. 2d 1331 (Utah App. 1988).
3.

Because Plaintiff is self-employed,

or at least

employed in a company in which he and his wife are major employees,
stockholders and record keepers, it is very difficult to establish
precisely what each receives from that company.
4.

The

burden

of

proof

in

establishing

that

a

substantial change of material circumstances has occurred which
requires

the

court

to modify

the

Decree

Plaintiff, Bridenbauah v. Bridenbauah,
1990).

of

Divorce,

786 P. 2d 241

is

upon

(Utah App.

The Plaintiff has failed to meet this test in light of the

fact that he has not established clearly what he and his wife were
paid by the company by which they are employed and of which they
are

controlling

parties.

Plaintiff

has

not

established

material change in the earnings of the Defendant.
4

any

The Plaintiff

acknowledges that his earnings were uncertain at the time that he
entered into the Agreement in February,

1991 to pay alimony and

child support in the amounts ordered by the court and taking all of
these circumstances together, the Plaintiff has failed to establish
the change in circumstances required for a modification of the
Decree of Divorce that was entered in this matter based upon the
Stipulation agreement of the parties.
5.

The Defendant has requested that she be awarded

attorney' s fees for being required to defend this matter and that
judgment be entered against the Plaintiff for the unpaid alimony
and child support under the original Decree of Divorce.

She should

be directed to submit her Affidavit regarding the attorney' s fees
so that the court can determine whether or not the Defendant is
entitled to attorney' s fees and if so, in what amount based upon
the economic circumstances of the parties pursuant to the evidence
introduced by them at the
matter.
tie Atrial
Atrial in
in thiar
tnisr maDATED this

/ ^ay

of E&rfch, 1993.

•ftlCHAto H/ MOEfFAT,
District/Coufr£/ Judge
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APPROVED AS TO
THIS
'- day Of
March, 1993:

i

r

~4

ELLEN MAZCOCK, Counsel
for Plaintiff

~L%**+d/&
DAVID S. DOLOWITZ, Counse]
for Defendant
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DAVID S. DOLOWITZ (0899)
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL
525 East First South
Fifth Floor
P. O. Box 11008
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008
Telephone (801) 532-2666
Attorney for Defendant
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
oooOOOooo
FRANK P. O' DONNELL,

)
)

Plaintiff,

O R D E R

)

vs.

)

MARY A. O' DONNELL,

)

Defendant.

Civil No. 884902181DA
Judge:

Richard H. Moffat

)
oooOOOooo

The above-entitled matter came before the court for trial
on the Plaintiff s Petition to Modify the Divorce Decree and to
Reduce Alimony and Child Support and the Defendant' s Request for
Attorney' s Fees incurred in defending the Plaintiff s Petition.
The Plaintiff was present in person represented by counsel, Ellen
Maycock.

The Defendant was present in person

counsel, David S. Dolowitz.
testimony
introduced
advisement.

of

each

of

by them,
Having

the

represented

by

The court heard and considered the
parties

and

then determined
considered

the

reviewed

to take
evidence

the

exhibits

the matter
presented,

under
the

arguments of counsel, and the governing law, the court issued its
Minute Entry Ruling on the 4th day of December, 1992.

Being thus

advised in the premises, and having entered its Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law,
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED
that:
1.

The Petition of the Plaintiff to Modify the Decree

of Divorce is denied.
2.

The Defendant shall submit her Affidavit regarding

attorney' s fees and unpaid alimony and child support so that the
court can determine whether or not the Defendant is entitled to
attorney' s fees and if so, in what amount based upon the economic
circumstances of the parties pursuant to the evidence introduce by
them at the trial in this jtvatter
DATED this

'

day of

District /Comrt/ Judge
~r<^

2

APPROVED AS 10
FORM AMB-^eOMTBflT
day of
THIS ^ '•
March, 1993: ;

ELLEN MAYCOCK, Counsel
for Plaintiff

DAVID S. DOLOWITZ, Counsel
for Defendant

\
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed this

[ f

day

of March, 1993, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order to
the following individual:
Ms. Ellen Maycock
KRUSE, LANDA & MAYCOCK
Eighth Floor, Valley Tower
50 West Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Counsel for Plaintiff

(mb\dsd\0*Donnell.

Order)
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Tab 6

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

Frank O'Donnell,
Plaintiffs,

:
:

MINUTE ENTRY
CASE NO: 884902181 DA

vs.

:
JUDGE RICHARD H. MOFFAT

Mary Agnes O'Donnell,
Defendant.

:

The Court having considered the Objection to the Request for Attorney's Fees and having
heard oral argument thereon and now being fully advised in the premises makes this its:
MINUTE ENTRY
The Court feels the question as to whether or not the defendant will obligated to pay
attorney's fees by reason of the fact that she is employed by her attorney is not the proper
inquiry in this case. Obviously she is entitled to be awarded her attorney's fees if under all the
principles governing such matters she would normally be so entitled. The question of whether
or not her attorney by and through the generosity of himself and his firm is willing to absorb
the loss, if the defendant sustains one, should not be determinative as to whether or not the
defendant is entitled to those fees under the general principles. The Court is of the opinion that
in this case the defendant has demonstrated a need for some of her attorney's fees to be paid by
the plaintiff and that the plaintiff by reason of the fact that both he and his wife are employed
and are earning more money than the plaintiff regardless of what that amount might be and by
the reason of the fact that the defendant has not been paid the amounts to which she is entitled

ODONNELL V. ODONNELL

PAGE 2

MINUTE ENTRY

under the orders of the Court all mitigate toward the award of some attorney's fees to the
defendant from the plaintiff. The Court is opinion that the plaintiff should pay $4,000.00 of the
defendant's attorney's fees and costs.
Counsel for the defendant will prepare an appropriate order.

ODONNELL V. ODONNELL

PAGE 3

MINUTE ENTRY

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Minute Entry,
postage prepaid, to the following on this
Ellen Maycock
KRUSE, LANDA & MAYCOCK
Attorney for Plaintiff
Eighth Floor, Valley Tower
50 West Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
David S. Dolowitz
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL
Attorney for Defendant
P. O. Box 11008
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008

I(

day of May, 1993.
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DAVID S. DOLOWITZ (0899)
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL
525 East First South
Fifth Floor
P.O. Box 11008
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008
Telephone (801) 532-2666
Attorney for Defendant
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
oooO 0 Oooo
FRANK P. O'DONNELL,
ORDER AND JUDGMENT
Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No. 884902181DA

MARY A. O'DONNELL,

Judge:

Richard H. Moffat

Defendant.
oooO 0 Oooo
Having
Conclusions

of

heretofore
Law

and

entered

Decree

its

in the

Findings

of

Fact,

above-referenced

matter

rejecting the Plaintiff's Petition to Amend the Decree of Divorce
and having therein in paragraph 5 reserved the issue of attorney's
fees and having now had the opportunity to consider the Defendant's
request for attorney's fees, the court has determined from the
evidence presented that the Defendant is in need of assistance in
the payment of her attorney's fees; that she incurred attorney's
fees in the sum of $5,616.75; that the court has examined those
attorney's

fees and,

finding

that both

the

Plaintiff

and

his

present wife are employed, and that Plaintiff has actual earnings
and the obligation of support to him owed by his present wife while
the Defendant has lesser earnings and no additional support coming

to her, finds and concludes that the attorney's fees incurred by
Defendant are reasonable, the Plaintiff has the ability to assist
Defendant

in payment of her attorney's fees and the

Plaintiff

should be ordered to pay to the Defendant attorney's fees in the
sum of $4,000.00 and that judgment should be entered against him
for that amount.
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED
that judgment is entered in favor of the Defendant and against the
Plaintiff for $4,000.00 as attorney's fees incurred in this matter
and the Plaintiff is ordered to pay to the Plaintiff the $4,000.00
in attorney's fees thus incurred.
DATED this

//

day of

1993

v// -& I
COUR/T7/JUDGE '-''iZ-A*.
// /

APPROVED AS TO FORM AND
CONTENT:
ELLEN MAYCOCK, Counsel
for Plaintiff
c^

7^//^
DAVID S. DOLOWITZ, Coun
for Defendant

2

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed this 2» ( day
of May, 1993, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order and
Judgment to the following individual:
Ms. Ellen Maycock
KRUSE, LANDA & MAYCOCK
Eighth Floor, Valley Tower
50 West Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Counsel for Plaintiff

(mb\dsd\O'Donnell.Fees)
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